The classical synthesis problem for reactive systems asks, given a proponent process A and an opponent process B, to refine A so that the closed-loop system A||B satisfies a given specification Φ. The solution of this problem requires the computation of a winning strategy for proponent A in a game against opponent B.
Introduction
The algorithmic synthesis (or control) of reactive systems is based on solving two-player zero-sum games on graphs [8, 9] . Player 1 (representing the system or controller to be synthesized) attempts to satisfy a specification Φ; player 2 (representing the environment or plant) tries to violate the specification. Synthesis is successful if a strategy for player 1 can be found which ensures that Φ is satisfied no matter what player 2 does. These games are zero-sum, because the objective of player 2 is ¬Φ, the negation of player 1's objective. In other words, synthesis assumes the worst-case scenario that player 2 is as obstructive as possible.
In many game situations in economics, the two players do not have strictly complementary objectives. Then the appropriate notion of rational behavior is that of a Nash equilibrium. One also encounters non-zero-sum situations in computer science applications [7] . We demonstrate, for from certain winning strategies on the two abstract games, we can infer secure equilibrium strategies on the concrete game. To our knowledge, this is the first abstraction methodology that works with two independent abstractions of a single game structure. Single-player abstractions suffice for zero-sum games (the abstraction weakens one player and strengthens the other). However, for non-zero-sum games, the two-abstractions methodology suggests itself, because each abstraction focuses on the objective of a different player and may thus omit different details. In this way, both abstractions may have smaller state spaces than a combined abstraction would. Specifically, we provide proof rules for inferring secure equilibrium strategies on a concrete 3-player non-zero-sum game from classical winning strategies on two abstract 2-player zero-sum games, for the cases of safety and Büchi objectives. In fact, in the safety case, our proof rule corresponds closely to the assume-guarantee rule of [1] . In the Büchi case, our rule provides a novel assume-guarantee rule for the verification of specifications under weak fairness.
2 Co-synthesis
Processes and schedulers
Let X be a finite set of variables such that each variable x ∈ X has a finite domain D x . We denote by θ[X] ∈ x∈X D x a valuation on X that assigns each variable x ∈ X a value θ(x) ∈ D x . We denote by Θ[X] the set of all valuations on X. For A ⊆ X and a valuation θ[X] we denote by θ[X] ↾ A the restriction of the valuation on the set A of variables.
Processes. For i ∈ { 1, 2 }, a process P i = (X i , δ i ) consists of a finite set X i of variables and a non-deterministic transition function δ i : Θ[X i ] → 2 Θ[X i ] \ ∅, i.e., the transition function given a present valuation specifies the possible updates. We denote by X = X 1 ∪ X 2 the set of all variables.
Scheduler. A scheduler Sc at each round chooses whether it is process P 1 's or process P 2 's turn to update the variables. Formally, the scheduler Sc is a function Sc : Θ[X] * → {1, 2}. A fair scheduler assigns turns to both process P 1 and P 2 infinitely often, i.e., let τ ∈ (Θ[X]) ω be an infinite sequence of valuations and let τ i denote the prefix of length i of τ ; for a fair scheduler Sc for all τ there exists infinitely many i ≥ 0 and j ≥ 0 such that Sc(τ i ) = 1 and Sc(τ j ) = 2.
Refinement of processes.
A refinement of a process P i = (X i , δ i ) is a process P ′ i = (X ′ i , δ ′ i ) such that 1. X i ⊆ X ′ i ; and 2. for all θ[
e., the process P ′ i has possibly more variables and every possible update of variables of X i in P ′ i is a possible update in P i . We denote by P ′
. .) the restriction of τ (X) on the set A of variables. The notation for a set of traces is similar.
Traces of processes and scheduler. Given process P 1 = (X 1 , δ 1 ), P 2 = (X 2 , δ 2 ), a scheduler Sc and a starting valuation v 0 ∈ Θ[X], where X = X 1 ∪ X 2 , the set of all possible traces are
We consider only ω-regular specifications in this paper [11] .
Weak co-synthesis
The weak co-synthesis problem is formulated as follows:
1. Input. Processes P 1 = (X 1 , δ 1 ), P 2 = (X 2 , δ 2 ); and specifications Φ 1 (X) for player 1 and Φ 2 (X) for player 2, and a starting valuation v 0 ∈ Θ[X], where X = X 1 ∪ X 2 .
2. Solution problem. Does there exist
and for all fair schedulers Sc we have
Example 1 (Mutual exclusion protocol synthesis) We will consider the synthesis of the mutual exclusion (mutex) protocol of two processes as shown in Fig 1. We use the short-hand notations 2 and 3 to denote always (safety) and eventually (reachability) specifications, respectively. A process i places a request to enter the critical section by setting flag[i] = 1 and the entering of the process i in the critical section is denoted by Cri = true. The process can stay in the critical section for an arbitrary finite amount of time (denoted as fin wait), and then comes out of the critical section and assigns Cri = false. The choice (C9, C10) expresses that the process can arbitrarily wait (for possibly infinitely long) without any further request to enter the critical section or proceed with a request to enter the critical section. The specification for process 1 is consists of two parts:
The specification Φ and Φ mutex
1
. The specification Φ 2 for process 2 is symmetric.
Example 2 (Undesirable behavior synthesis) A solution of the weak co-synthesis formulation (i.e., P ′ 1 and P ′ 2 ) is given in Fig 2. However, the solution is not satisfactory because process 1 depends on the fact that process 2 requests for the critical section infinitely often to make progress. If process 2 only makes a single request for the critical section and then never makes further request, then the progress specification of process 1 is easily violated.
Classical co-synthesis
The classical co-synthesis problem is formulated as follows: 
Example 3 (Mutex protocol synthesis) The answer to the classical synthesis problem for Example 1 is "NO". We will argue later (in Example 5) why the answer to the given problem is negative.
Assume-guarantee synthesis
We now present a new formulation of the co-synthesis problem, and the idea of the formulation is derived from the notion of secure equilibrium [3] . We refer to this new formulation as the assumeguarantee synthesis problem. Figure 2 : Weak co-synthesis 1. Input. Processes P 1 = (X 1 , δ 1 ), P 2 = (X 2 , δ 2 ); and specifications Φ 1 (X) for player 1 and Φ 2 (X) for player 2, and a starting valuation v 0 ∈ Θ[X], where X = X 1 ∪ X 2 .
Example 4 (Assume-guarantee synthesis of mutex protocol) A solution to the assume-guarantee synthesis problem for Example 1 is shown in Fig 3. We will argue the correctness of the solution as assume-guarantee synthesis problem later (in Example 6). The synthesis of the processes shown in Fig 3 is the Peterson mutual exclusion protocol.
The success of the assume-guarantee synthesis problem for the mutex protocol of Example 1 and the failure of the classical co-synthesis problem suggests the classical co-synthesis formulation is too strong.
3 Game Algorithms for Co-synthesis
Three player games
We consider games played on game graphs with three players. Game graphs. A game graph G = ((S, E), (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 )) consists of a directed graph (S, E) with a finite state space S and a set E of edges, and a partition (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) of the state space S into three sets. The states in S 1 are player 1 states, the states in S 2 are player 2 states, and the states in S 3 are player 3 states. For a state s ∈ S, we write E(s) = { t ∈ S | (s, t) ∈ E } for the set of successor states of s. We assume that every state has at least one out-going edge, i.e., E(s) is non-empty for all states s ∈ S.
Plays. A game is played by three players: player 1, player 2, and player 3, who form an infinite path in the game graph by moving a token along edges. They start by placing the token on an initial state, and then they take moves indefinitely in the following way. If the token is on a state in S 1 , then player 1 moves the token along one of the edges going out of the state. If the token is on a state in S 2 (or S 3 ), then player 2 (resp. player 3 ) does likewise. The result is an infinite path in the game graph; we refer to such infinite paths as plays. Formally, a play is an infinite sequence s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . of states such that (s k , s k+1 ) ∈ E for all k ≥ 0. We write Ω for the set of all plays. Strategies. A strategy for a player is a recipe that specifies how to extend plays. Formally, a strategy σ i for player i is a function σ i : S * · S i → S that, given a finite sequence of states (representing the history of the play so far) which ends in a player i state, chooses the next state. The strategy must choose only available successors, i.e., for all w ∈ S * and s ∈ S i , if σ i (w · s) = t, then t ∈ E(s). We write Σ i for the set of all strategies for player i. Strategies in general require memory to remember the history of plays. An equivalent definition of strategies is as follows. Let M be a set called memory. A strategy with memory can be described as a pair of functions: (a) a memory-update function σ u : S × M → M that, given the memory and the current state, updates the memory; and (b) a next-state function σ n : S × M → S that, given the memory and the current state, specifies the successor state. The strategy is finite-memory if the memory M is finite. The strategy is memoryless if the memory M is a singleton set. The memoryless strategies do not depend on the history of a play, but only on the current state. Each memoryless strategy for player i can be specified as a function σ i : S i → S such that σ i (s) ∈ E(s) for all s ∈ S i . Given a starting state s ∈ S, strategies σ i ∈ Σ i , for player 1, player 2 and player 3, there is a unique play, denoted ω(s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , which is defined as follows: s 0 = s and for all k ≥ 0, if
Notations. Objectives Φ in G are subsets of plays, i.e., Φ ⊆ Ω. We define the notion of winning for an objective, for a player and a set of players as follows: the notations are derived from ATL [2] . For an objective Φ the set of winning states for player 1 in a game graph G is as follows:
and a witness strategy σ 1 for player 1 for the existential quantification is referred to as a winning strategy. The notations for winning states 2 G (Φ) and 3 G (Φ) for player 2 and player 3 are similar. The notion of the set of winning states for objective Φ in a game graph G, for player 1 and player 2 combined against player 3 is as follows:
and the notations for 1, 3 G (Φ) and 2, 3 G (Φ) are similar. The following determinacy results follows from the result of [5] .
Theorem 1 (Finite-memory determinacy [5] ) For all ω-regular objectives Φ, for all three player game graphs G, for all I ⊆ { 1, 2, 3 } and J = { 1, 2, 3 } \ I, the following assertions hold: (a) I G (Φ) = S \ J G (¬Φ); and (b) there exists finite-memory strategies for players in I such that against all strategies of the players in J, for all states in s ∈ I G (Φ), the play starting at s given the strategies satisfy Φ.
Game solution to weak and classical co-synthesis
Game graph. We associate with the processes and scheduler a game graph G cosynthesis = ((S, E), (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 )) defined as follows:
1. The set of states S is as follows:
2. The set of edges E is as follows:
Restriction of plays. We define the restriction of plays to valuations as follows: given a play
Objectives. Objectives Φ in the game G cosynthesis are subsets of plays, i.e., Φ ⊆ S ω . We only consider ω-regular objectives [11] . Given a specification
For the rest of the section the objective of player 3 is the fairness objective Φ 3 to satisfy that both S 1 and S 2 are visited infinitely often.
Lemma 1 (Game solution of weak co-synthesis) Given processes P 1 = (X 1 , δ 1 ), P 2 = (X 2 , δ 2 ); and specifications Φ 1 (X) for player 1 and Φ 2 (X) for player 2, and a starting valuation
. The answer to the weak co-synthesis problem is "YES" if and only if
Proof.(Sketch). We first note that for games with ω-regular objectives, finite-memory winning strategies suffices (Theorem 1). The proof follows by the following case analysis.
1. Given a finite-memory strategy σ 1 , a witness P ′ 1 = (X ′ 1 , δ ′ 1 ) for the weak co-synthesis problem can be obtained as follows: the variables X ′ i \ X i encodes the finite-memory information of the strategy σ 1 and the next-state function of the strategy is then captured by a deterministic update function δ ′ 1 . A similar construction holds for player 2.
2. Given a witness P ′ 1 = (X ′ 1 , δ ′ 1 ) as a witness for the weak co-synthesis problem, we first observe that any deterministic restriction of P ′ 1 (i.e., the transition function δ ′ 1 is made deterministic) is also a witness to the weak co-synthesis problem. A witness strategy σ 1 in G cosynthesis is obtained as follows: the variables in X ′ 1 \ X 1 is encoded as the finite-memory information of σ 1 and the deterministic update is captured by the next-state function. The construction of witness strategies for player 2 is similar.
Lemma 2 (Game solution of classical co-synthesis) Given processes P 1 = (X 1 , δ 1 ), P 2 = (X 2 , δ 2 ); and specifications Φ 1 (X) for player 1 and Φ 2 (X) for player 2, and a starting valua-
. The answer to the classical co-synthesis problem is "YES" if and only if
The proof for Lemma 2 is similar to Lemma 1.
Example 5 (Failure of classical co-synthesis) We now argue the failure of the classical cosynthesis for Example 1. We show that for every strategy for process 1, there exists spoiling strategy for process 2 and scheduler such that specification of process 1 is violated. We first consider the choices of process 1 (C1 -C8) and produce spoiling strategies for process 2 and the scheduler. Observe that in this case process 2 cannot falsify process 1's specification satisfying her own specification.
It is easy to argue from the above construction, that for every strategy for process 1, there exists strategy for process 2 and the scheduler that falsify process 1's specification. Hence the answer to the classical co-synthesis problem is negative.
Secure equilibrium and game solution to assume-guarantee synthesis
In this subsection we consider three player games with lexicographic ordering of objectives and the notion of equilibrium is formalized as the notion of secure equilibrium [4] . We consider the special class of games where player 3 can win unconditionally, i.e., given the objective Φ 3 for player 3 we have 3 G (Φ 3 ) = S. In the setting of processes and scheduler (as player 3) with the fairness objective Φ 3 for the scheduler, the restriction that 3 G (Φ 3 ) = S means the scheduler has a fair scheduling strategy from all states. In the special case when the scheduler is not restricted to be fair, the objective Φ 3 of the scheduler is the set of all paths and the restriction is satisfied trivially. We first present the notion of secure equilibrium and then provide unique characterization of the winning secure equilibrium states (Theorem 2). We also establish the existence of finite-memory winning secure equilibrium strategies (Theorem 3) and relate the assume-guarantee synthesis problem to solving three player games with winning secure equilibrium (Theorem 4).
Values and payoff-profiles. Given objectives Φ i for player i, strategies σ i for player i, for i ∈ { 1, 2, 3 } and a state s, we denote by val i the value for player i and is defined as follows:
and the payoff-profile (val 1 (s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ), val 2 (s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ), val 3 (s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 )) consists of the value for each player, and i-th component represents the value for player i. We now present the notion of secure equilibrium [3]. Since 3 G (Φ 3 ) = S, any equilibrium payoff-profile will assign value 1 to player 3. Hence we will focus on payoff-profiles with value 1 for player 3.
Payoff-profile ordering. The preference order i for player i is defined as follows:
In the special case where the value for player 3 is 1, the player 1 preference order 1 and the player 2 preference order 2 on payoff profiles are obtained lexicographically:
that is, player 1 prefers a payoff profile which gives her greater payoff, and if two payoff profiles match in the first component, then she prefers the payoff profile in which the player 2's payoff is minimized; symmetrically,
The preference order for player 3 is as follows:
The preference ordering for each player is shown in Fig 4. Given two payoff profiles (val 1 , val 2 , val 3 ) and (val
Secure equilibrium and maximal secure equilibrium. A strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) is a secure equilibrium at a state s iff the following conditions hold: 1, 1) ≺1 (0, 0, 1) ≺1 (1, 1, 1) ≺1 (1, 0, 1) Player 1 preference order.   (1, 0, 1) ≺2 (0, 0, 1) ≺2 (1, 1, 1) ≺2 (0, 1, 1 ) Player 2 preference order.
≺3 ≺3 ≺3
Figure 4: Payoff-profile preference ordering.
i.e., (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) is a Nash equilibrium with respect to the payoff-profile orderings i for player i, where i ∈ { 1, 2, 3 }. For v, w ∈ {0, 1}, we write S vw1 ⊆ S to denote the set of states s such that a secure equilibrium with the payoff profile (v, w, 1) exists in the game G at s with objectives Φ i for player i, that is, s ∈ S vw1 iff there is a secure equilibrium (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) at s such that
. Similarly, MS vw1 ⊆ S vw1 denotes the set of states s such that the payoff profile (v, w, 1) is a maximal secure equilibrium payoff profile at s, that is, s ∈ MS vw1 iff (1) s ∈ S vw1 and (2) 
. The set of states MS 111 is referred to as the winning secure equilibrium states and witness secure equilibrium strategies as winning secure equilibrium strategies.
Characterization of MS 111 . Let
Lemma 3 In Z 1 the unique secure equilibrium is (1, 0, 1).
, consider the strategy pair (σ 1 , σ 3 ) such that against all player 2 strategies σ 2 and for all states s ∈ Z 1 we have ω(s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) ∈ Φ 1 ∧ Φ 3 ∧ ¬Φ 2 . The secure equilibrium strategy pair (σ * 1 , σ * 3 ) for player 1 and player 3 (along with any strategy σ 2 for player 2) is constructed as follows.
1. The strategy σ * 1 is as follows: player 1 plays σ 1 and if player 3 deviates from σ 3 , then player 1 switches to a winning strategy for Φ 3 → Φ 1 . Such a strategy exists since
2. The strategy σ * 3 is as follows: player 3 plays σ 3 and if player 1 deviates from σ 1 , then player 3 switches to a winning strategy for Φ 3 . Such a strategy exists since 3 G (Φ 3 ) = S.
Hence objective of player 1 is always satisfied, given objective of player 3 is satisfied. Thus player 3 has no incentive to deviate. Similarly, player 1 also has no incentive to deviate. The result follows. Z 2 the unique secure equilibrium is (0, 1, 1) .
Lemma 4 In
Proof. By Theorem 1 we have S \ W = 3 G (Φ 3 ∧ (¬Φ 1 ∨ ¬Φ 2 )) and there is a player 3 strategy σ 3 that satisfies Φ 3 ∧ (¬Φ 1 ∨ ¬Φ 2 ) against all strategies of player 1 and player 2. Hence the equilibrium (1, 1, 1) cannot exist in the complement set of W , i.e., MS 111 ⊆ W . We now show that in W there is a secure equilibrium with payoff-profile (1, 1, 1) . The following construction ensures.
1. In W ∩ U 1 , player 1 plays a winning strategy for objective Φ 3 → Φ 1 , and player 2 plays a winning strategy for objective (
, and hence such a winning strategy exists for player 2.
2. In W ∩(U 2 \U 1 ), player 2 plays a winning strategy for objective Φ 3 → Φ 2 , and player 1 plays a winning strategy for objective (
, and hence such a winning strategy exists for player 1.
By Theorem 1 we have
is as follows: player 1 and player 2 play a strategy (σ 1 , σ 2 ) to satisfy Φ 1 ∧ Φ 2 against all strategies of player 3, and player 3 plays a winning strategy for Φ 3 ; if player 1 deviates, then player 2 and player 3 switches to a strategy (σ 2 , σ 3 ) such that against all strategies for player 1 the objective Φ 3 ∧ ¬Φ 1 is satisfied; and if player 2 deviates, then player 1 and player 3 switches to a strategy (σ 1 , σ 3 ) such that against all strategies for player 2 the objective Φ 3 ∧ ¬Φ 2 is satisfied. Hence neither player 1 and nor player 2 has any incentive to deviate according to the preference order 1 and 2 , respectively.
The result follows.
Strategic characterization of MS 111 . To obtain a characterization of MS 111 in terms of winning strategies we define the notion of retaliating strategies. The set of retaliation strategies for player 1 and player 2 as follows:
Proof. We first show that U ⊆ MS 111 . For a state s ∈ U , pick σ 1 ∈ Re 1 (s) and σ 2 ∈ Re 2 (s) such that for all σ 3 ∈ Σ 3 we have ω(s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) ∈ Φ 3 → (Φ 1 ∧ Φ 2 ). Then fixing (σ 1 , σ 2 ) for player 1 and player 2, and a winning strategy for player 3 we obtain a secure equilibrium of (1, 1, 1) .
We now show that MS 111 ⊆ U . The result follows from the proof of Theorem 2. We proved that for s ∈ G \ (Z 1 ∪ Z 2 ) we have Re 1 (s) = ∅ and Re 2 (s) = ∅. The strategy construction in Theorem 2 in W is a witness that for all s ∈ MS 111 we have s ∈ U .
Observe that the construction of secure equilibrium strategies in Theorem 2 are finite-memory strategies for ω-regular objectives. The existence of finite-memory secure equilibrium strategies and argument similar to Lemma 1 establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (
Example 6 (Assume-guarantee synthesis of mutex protocol) It follows from the analysis in Example 5 that all choices other than the choice C8 for process 1 cannot be witness for the assume-guarantee synthesis problem. The choice C8 for process 1 and the symmetric choice C5 for process 2 yield a witness for the assume-guarantee synthesis problem.
Abstraction-based Co-synthesis
The results of Section 3 provide game algorithms for the co-synthesis problems. However the state space of the original game structure can be large and algorithmic analysis on the original game structure can be impractical. In this section we present sound proof rules for game solutions for the co-synthesis problems from simpler game structures (abstractions). In Section 3 we established correspondence of the weak, classical and assume-guarantee synthesis problem with game solutions for the respective co-synthesis problem. In this section we focus on sound proof rules for the game solutions. We first present the notion of abstractions and review the sound proof rules for the weak and classical co-synthesis problem. We then present sound proof rules for the assume-guarantee synthesis problem for safety and Büchi (liveness) objectives. In particular we show how to solve zero-sum simpler game structures (abstractions) and obtain witness of winning secure equilibrium strategies in the original game structure from the winning strategies of the simpler games.
Abstractions
Abstractions. An abstraction G A Ξ (I), for I ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, for a game structure G = ((S, E),
) with a concretization function Ξ : S A → 2 S \∅ such that the following conditions hold.
• The abstraction preserves the player structures: for all i ∈ { 1, 2, 3 }, for all s A ∈ S A i we have Ξ(s A ) ⊆ S i .
• The abstraction partitions the concrete state space: s A ∈S A Ξ(s A ) = S and for every s ∈ S there is an unique s A ∈ S A such that s ∈ Ξ(s A ).
• Universal abstraction of edges for players in I and existential abstraction of edges for players in J = { 1, 2, 3 } \ I:
Mapping of plays and strategies. Given a play ω = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . ∈ Ω in G we obtain the play
The notation for prefix of plays (i.e., history of a play) is similar. For i ∈ I, and a strategy σ A i we denote by σ i = Ξ(σ A i ) the strategy defined as follows: for a history w ∈ S * and s ∈ S i , the strategy σ i chooses a successor t in Ξ(σ A i (Ξ(w·s))); observe that since the abstraction of edges for player i is universal, the construction of the strategy is sound.
Abstraction of objectives. Given an objective Φ in G we use the following notations for objectives in G A Ξ (I)
Existential projection:
For abstraction G A Ξ (I) the objectives of players in I are obtained by universal projection and objectives of players in { 1, 2, 3 } \ I are obtained by existential projection. For singleton i, in sequel we write G A Ξ (i) to denote G A Ξ ({ i }).
Proof rules
The following theorem is the basic principle of obtaining sound proof rules for weak and classical co-synthesis problem.
Theorem 5 Given a game structure G, an objective Φ, and an abstraction
, then for all s ∈ Ξ(s A ) we have s ∈ 1 G (Φ). Similar result hold for player 2 abstractions.
We now present sound proof rules for secure equilibrium for safety and Büchi objectives (as a special case the result can be also obtained for reachability objectives).
Safety objectives. For a set F ⊆ S, the safety objective requires the set F is never left. Formally, the safety objective 2(F ) defines the set of plays { s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . | ∀i ≥ 0. s i ∈ F }. Given safety objectives for both players, whether the scheduler is a fair scheduler or not is immaterial, since if a safety objective can be violated, then it can also be violated by a fair scheduler. Hence in proof rules for safety objectives for simplicity the objective of player 3 is assumed to be the set of all plays. A sound proof rule for secure equilibrium with safety objectives is presented in the following theorem. The classical assume-guarantee rule can be obtained as a special case of the following result by restricting the strategies of player 1 and player 2 to singletons and interpreting player 3 as the universal player that resolves all non-determinism (observe that player 3 is not restricted to be fair in the following theorem).
Theorem 6 Let G be a game structure with safety objectives Φ 1 and Φ 2 for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Let G A Ξ (1) and G A Ξ (2) be player 1 and player 2 abstractions, respectively. Let the objectives for the players in
. The strategies σ * 1 = Ξ(σ 1 ) and σ * 2 = Ξ(σ 2 ) are retaliation strategies in G, and for all σ 3 we have ω(s, σ * 1 , σ * 2 , σ 3 ) ∈ Φ 1 ∧ Φ 2 . Liberal retaliation strategies. Given safety objectives 2(F 1 ) and 2(F 2 ) for player 1 and player 2, respectively, a strategy σ 1 for player 1 is a liberal retaliation strategy if (a) σ 1 is a retaliation strategy; and (b) for all histories s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k such that for all i ≤ k, s i ∈ F 1 , such that the history can arise by playing σ 1 and some strategies σ 2 , σ 3 , there is a strategy σ 2 , such that for all σ 3 we have ω(s, σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) ∈ 2(F 2 ). It means that any threat strategy is not invoked as long as the player is safe. We denote by LRe 1 the set of liberal retaliation strategies for player 1, and the definition for LRe 2 is similar. The next lemma follows since if both plays play any liberal retaliation strategies, then for all strategies σ 3 the play never leaves F 1 ∩ F 2 .
Lemma 5 Given a game structure G with safety objectives Φ 1 and Φ 2 for player 1 and player 2, respectively, if s ∈ MS 111 , then
Büchi objectives. For a set B ⊆ S, the Büchi objective requires the set B is visited infinitely often. Formally, the Büchi objective 23(B) defines the set of plays { s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . | ∀i ≥ 0. ∃j ≥ i. s i ∈ B }. A sound proof rule for secure equilibrium with Büchi objectives is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Let G be a game structure with Büchi objectives Φ 1 = 23(B 1 ) and Φ 2 = 23(B 2 ) for player 1 and player 2, respectively, and the fairness objective Φ 3 for player 3. Let G A Ξ (1) and G A Ξ (2) be player 1 and player 2 abstractions, respectively, and G A Ξ ({ 1, 2 }) be player 1 and 2 abstraction. Let the objectives for the players be
.
For all s A ∈ C A 3 and for all s ∈ Ξ(s A ) we have s ∈ MS 111 in G.
Proof. (Sketch). There exist strategies (σ A 1 , σ A 2 ) for player 1 and player 2 in G A Ξ ({ 1, 2 }) such that for all s A ∈ C A 3 and for all strategies σ A 3 we have ω A (s A , σ A 1 , σ A 2 , σ A 3 ) ∈ Φ 1 3 → (Φ 3 1 ∧ Φ 3 2 ), and the strategies also ensure that once B 1 is reached a state in B 2 is reached within at most |S|-visits to B 1 and that once B 2 is reached a state in B 1 is reached within at most |S|-visits to B 2 . Let σ A 1 be a strategy in G A Ξ (1) such that for all s A ∈ C A 1 and for all strategies σ A 2 , σ A 3 we have ω A (s A , σ A 1 , σ A 2 , σ A 3 ) ∈ (Φ 1 3 ∧ Φ 1 2 ) → Φ 1 1 ; and let σ A 2 be a strategy in G A Ξ (2) such that for all s A ∈ C A 2 and for all strategies σ A 1 , σ A 3 we have ω A (s A , σ A 1 , σ A 2 , σ A 3 ) ∈ (Φ 1 3 ∧ Φ 2 1 ) → Φ 2 2 . The witness for retaliation strategies for the conclusion is as follows.
• Strategy σ * 1 : player 1 starts playing the co-operating strategy Ξ(σ A 1 ) obtained from G A Ξ ({1, 2}) to satisfy Φ 3 → (Φ 1 ∧ Φ 2 ) and also ensures C 1 is not left; whenever a state in B 2 is reached after a visit to B 1 , then player 1 continues to play Ξ(σ A 1 ) for at most |S|-visits to B 2 and if B 1 is not reached within |S| visit to B 2 , then player 1 switches to the strategy Ξ( σ A 1 ) obtained from G A Ξ (1) to satisfy (Φ 3 ∧ Φ 2 ) → Φ 1 , and if B 1 is reached continue with the co-operating strategy Ξ(σ A 1 ) obtained from G A Ξ ({ 1, 2 }). The strategies (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) are witness retaliation strategies to prove the result.
Example 7 (Process abstractions) Consider the processes P 1 and P 2 shown in Fig 5 and the corresponding abstractions A 1 and A 2 shown in Fig 6 obtained by ignoring variables z 1 and z 2 , respectively. The objective for process i is 23(x i == 1), i.e., to set x i := 1 infinitely often. The strategy for process 1 for assume-guarantee synthesis as obtained from the abstraction is as follows: process 1 sets y 1 to 1 unless x 2 is set to 1 and when x 2 is set to 1, then process 1 sets y 1 to 0. The strategy for process 2 is obtained symmetrically. The above strategies obtained from the abstractions are witness to the assume-guarantee synthesis problem. 
